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subject
DATEF0
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT
SOURCE
"Kew
USSR
MILITARY TOOOSOT
Developments Jn Combat with Carrie: Strike Large Units in the Initial Periodar" by Captain First Rank Ye. Mooayev
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Docirner.tary Reliable source (fl).
Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Bew Developments in Coobat with Carrier Strike Large Units in the Initial Periodar" by Captain First Rank Ye. Keaayev. It appeared in2pecial version of the Soviet Journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. Issue? was probably sent to press in Kay or June
Headquarters Coament: Military Thought is published by the USS3 Ministry of Defense in three versions,RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has beer: issued monthlyhile the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in Sy the endI,ssues of the SECRET version had been6 of then
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Sew Developments Ir. Cccbat with Carrier Strike Large Units ln the Initial Periodar
by
Captain First RankHaeayev
In ths leading KATOevolution of thef the combined navies has recently beer. cade. Ir. performance of ite tasks cf eraed conflict at aea, su05arlr.es equipped with missiles capable of destroying military-political and economic targets with high-yield nuclear weapons co-zed into first place, ahead of aircraft carriers. However, tbe complement of the carrier fleet has not decreased. The plans of the NATO command provide, as before, for the e-.tion inoftrike carriers. It isharacter*
fact that new strike carriers have recently been brought Into 3emce, acong them the etcclc carrier "Enterprise". The atccic carrier, according to views previously expressed tyval command, should represent the basic nucleus of the offensive strengthleat.
The carrier aircraft fleetas also beer, brought date, in tn- neararge number of nev carrier attack and fighter aircraft will enter service. Theyeiling oflight spee*00 km, and the extent of their tactical radius of action isess thar. that of the present heavy attach aircraft "Sky 'terrier". On each carrier of the "Forrestal" type, as has nov oeen established, aboutircraft are fcasti, of which kO tore attackver-lcles for nuclearvhich theretock of about 1U0 nuclear tocbs, which it la calculated wiix be expenied during the firstouxa after the begUmingar (ir. peacetime tbe number of ccebaarrier is approximately half of thia). Tbe cocoa', capabilitiesarrier strike'large unit
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(avianosnoye udarnoyeareincreased by its possession ofuantity of nuclear bombs.
If it is accepted that an AUS will consist of three aircraft carriers of the type mentioned above,uclear strikes will be carried out by eircraft fro=trike force in the first three days after the startar, ever, though the losses of carrier aircraft in the air .are not less thanercent. Thus, each day carrier-ecrtw aircraft will destroy an average or0 large targets, located nothe coastal tone, but also ir; tee interior of the territory of the country. It follows that is spite of the revolution of forces which has beer, conducted, strike carriers have not lost their former significance in offensive operations at sea,and that they will retain this sig-ificar.ee for at least the next decade, so that their destruction is one of the primary tasks at the outsetar.
Cera tat with carrier strike large units has already been discussed* fovever,we can not agreeumber of the proposition9 which have been stated. Several of these are,in our opinion, incorrect in principle, and some require more precise definition, since the use of
an AUS* is now seer, differently by the cocsand of NATO than it was earlier. Confirmation of this is found in
recent exercises hell by the NATO command.
The view teat operations for the destruction of these units takeefensive or an offensive. accordance with the ales pursued by the operations, car. not be considered correct. He see Immediatelyivision of the possible operations for the destruction cf ar. AUS Into offensive and defensive can not besuccessful. perations. Ir. our opinion, can not be seen as analogous to the operations ofof ground forces, as has previously been done. Ihe tern "offensive operation" or "defensive operation"
*Articles af the Journal "Military Thought"
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when appliedaval foreation does not perait one to determine precisely how to distinguish between the operations of this formation. Bov should it be forgotten that there is no front line at sea, andarticular sectionea cr an ocean is not occupied as the result of ar. offensive.
Kor does the" direction ofacross
Ocean deteraine the form of combat operations. In our view, therefore, the teras -defensive"and "offensive* operations have no practical signifioar.ee when applied to the navy and should be rejected, particularly since the character andf th-f naval
aircraft andcarrying
Out the tasks of combat with carrier strike large units are always offensive.
It is also not entirely correct to consider the task of destroying the AUS as being in ail cases the main task of tha submarines, of the navalircraft and, to an equal extent, of long-range aviation. Long-rang- aviation may, of course, take part in the destructionarrier strike large uni with part of its forces. 3uc xust this beav? Assuredly, this is without foundation for the following reasons.
In the first place the basic function of Ions-range aviaticr. is obviously that of actionhe rear area of the enemy, and primarily that of destroying the nuclear/missile and aviation groupings of the enemy, together with his strategic missile troops. Sesides this, leng-range aviation nay also be es3lgr.cd to oerforn tasks in toe rain theater of military operations. er these conditions, on- can net axsect that even before the oegiar.lng of hostilities, forces able to be at constant readiness, solely for operations against an AUS, could be assigned fros piemert .
Secondly, th* basic weapons of long-rang? aviation-missiles with powerful nuclearare designed for
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tbe destruction of area targets of large dimension, such as large military-IndustrLai targets, naval bases and ports, especially strongly built structures, nuclear weaponand structures which art underground or Inbe weapons of naval missile-carrying aviation have baea
createdingle purposedestruction of mobile naval
targets such as are represented by all surface warships, Including large aircraft carriers and transport vessels. If such weapons are supplied as armament for individual large units of long-range aviation, these cease to be long-range aviation large units, in the true sense. By their nature these would be large units of naval missile-carrying avLatLon, although organizationally they might not enter the composition of the navy. Thus, the organizational designation has no significance here and the forces of the nary will be cooperating not with long-range aviationranch of the air forces, but with aviation large units, which will strengthen It constantly and which will always perform their tasks within the frameworkaval operat Ion.
In view of what has been said, one can not view on operation for the destruction of carrier strike large units solely as one ln wblcb,togcther with the basic types of naval forces of subcarlnes and miss lie-carrying navalaviation, troops of the Antl-alr Defense of the Country, and strategic missile troops will also participate. The situation In the initial periodar may develop lnanner that other branches of the armed forces will not be able to take part In this operation, at least not ln Its first stages, in which case the full weight of combat with the strike groupings of the enemy, and primarily with his aircraft carriers and missile-carrying large units, will rest upon our levy. Inase, this will be on Lode-pendent navalact which must not be lost sight of Ln scientific developments or In practLealtraining. The devotion of proper attention to tbe independent naval operation will permit us to find the most effective methods for combat vlth'the AUS, and to
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determine the direction along which forces and Deans oust be developed to support the coabat operations of submarines and naval aviation.
Let us define the aix of combat with the AUS. Sometimes, for example, it is asserted that this aim can be either destruction or weakening. In our view this is not entirely correct.
arrier strike large unit always carries nuclear weapons, and has its own means for their delivery, one simply can not speak of weakeningrouping. In all cases one must strive for its destruction before the carrier aircraft have reached the take-off line (rubezh podyena). It is therefore more correct not to speak of weakening but of the Immediate destruction of the strike carriers at tbe beginning of coabat operations. The mere weakeningrouping of the enemy's carrier forces does not remove the threatudden nuclear attack by hie, and does not decrease the strain on the forces detailed to repulse an enemy incursion from the air.
Arguments that the location of carriers in distant regions of an ocean precludes their destruction are Atocic submarines will clearly be able to carry out cocbat operations against the A'JS enywhere in the oceans of the world. Moreover their cissiles and torpedoes with nuclear warheads permit them to achieve complete .of the enemy. All possible help will be given to submarines in distant areas of the oceans by oissile-earrylng aircraft, whichtrong factor ir. the destruction of the AUS as the latter is approaching the point at which it launches its aircraft. Therefore, an operation for the destruction of carrier strike large units beginning with their detection and logically ending with their destruction, can not beefensive operation, alaed at weakening the AUS, either in forces, or still less in content. In armed conflict in land theaters of military operations, the task of destroying the nuclear/missile means of the enemy can not be of an indefinite nature. It is directed towards the decisive destruction of the nuclear/missile grouping of the enemy. The objective of combat with his carrier forces
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must be defined in exactly the sane manner.
also be clarified. For some reason it is sometimes esserted.without reservation, that combat with carrier strike large units should follow these lines: theof the AUS themselves, destruction or their mobile supply detachments at sea, and the destruction of the naval bases at which they are based. However, It is not indicated which of these lines will probably be the most important one. Cr. the other Land.tri<? fact that the destruction of the AUS at sea (ocean) is the main task or submarines and missile-carrying aircraft still does not add precision to the situation which is being examined nor does it explain to which method preference must be given In combat with the AUS.
If it is considered that the probable enemy will endeavor toar suddenly, in organizing coabat with the AUS one must proceed from the fact that at the startar all carrier strike large units will be, not at their bases, but at sea. Then, in the first four to five days of the war, they will be able because of their self-sufriclency to carry out combat cperations without feeling the need to replace supplies of weapons or of material-technical means. This alone shows which means of struggle with the AUS will become the most important in the course of the first days or armed struggle at sea. As rcr the destruction of AUS at bases or of their supply detachments at sea, these methods will takeubordinate character.
The destruction of bases, for example, will post probably occur as the result of strikes by missile troops aimed at disrupting the military and ecoraonie potential of the enemy, and not as the result of the destruction of the strike carriers at these bases. As ror supply detachments, their destruction will not solve the problem of destroying the AUS. Carrier large units would only lose their combatesult, and would be able,to regain it quickly;
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the destruction of all the detachments is no lessa task than coobat with the AUS. The most difficult task is reconnaissance and observation of the AUS, and the assignment -of forces whichide radius of action. This would be, moreover, in the period of the firstwhen the basic Torces of the fleet are directed towards the destruction of carrier large units as the main targets, destined for destruction during the first hours of the war. These are some of our definitions of the tenets of naval science on the general question of conbat with the carrier strike large units.
Let us now examine some of the practical questions of combat with these large units. As before, carrier strike Large units possess unlimited capabilities in the choice of area for deployment and for the delivery of nuclear strikes. Nor has the distance of the take-off line (dalnost rubezha podyeno) carrier aircreft changed. However, the method of using an AUS has changed. In recent NATO naval exercises the use of carrier strike large unitsingle operational-strategic axis has been practiced, and these have proceeded dispersal into individual carrier groups, in each of which there is one, or at the most two, strike carriers and warships possessing various types of defense. These groups carry out combat operations while deployedistanceiles from each other. Each such group is able to carry out, simultaneously, with itsinimum of someouclear strikes against our installations which are locatedistance of up0 km, andotrikes against targetsistance of u? to IOOO km from its maneuvering areas.
The area over which an AUS is now deployed may reach enormous dimensions (foriles). In an operation for the destruction of carrier strike large units, particular Importance is acquired byby the creationarge grouping ofand aircraft and by the determination of methods for their actions ln the routing of the AUS at sea {in the ocean).
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Reconnaissance Is responsible for the timely etection of the AUS and for establishing observation, not of the large unithole, but of each of its groups. The timely discovery of all carrier groups is becoming an extremely critical problem. Reconnaissance aircraft are able to perform this task cost adequately. It is true that great hopes have been placed in submarines. However, in our opinion, there is little basis for this. The capabilities of reconnaissance submarines areless than those of reconnaissance aircraft. The only advantage possessed by submarines lies ln their ability to attach themselvesingle carrier group and to follow it unceasingly, maintaining prolonged observation or it secretly. Against this, aviation is able,hort period of time, through the use or single aircraft, to survey enormous stitches of ocean, and to discover the complete operational formationhole, large unit, and the order which carrier groups are following. This is, unfortunately, ioposslble Tor submarines. Moving with the same speed as carriers, they can not leave them.and if they should, renewed contact with the same group is difficult to achieve. Thus, nuclear-powered submarines remain an auxiliary means of reconnaissance, as diesel-battery submarines were in their time.
It seems to us that one of the more aceeptabl-methods of reconnaissance against AUS by submarines may be the method of "lying inor the carrier strike groupings of the enecy, by.previously stationed in then which the forcer are based. This method may prove sufficently effective, since in this case the likelihood that the submarines vilL meet the enecy carriers win te When they detect carriers leaving their bases, the submarines would attach themselves and followuntil they receive the order to use their weapons. Obviously, the observation or an AUSarticularly difficult task for submarines which are deployed singly, and it would be advisable to use groups of submarines.
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Basically, the capabilities of aerial reconnaissance are technically determined by twDrange of -he aircraft and extent to which they arc equipped with technical apparatus. Unfortunately, neither the range nor the equipment of existing reconnaissance aircraft fully meets the requirements for the conductreat distance without establishment of visual contact with the target being reeonnoitered. Theircraft, as is known,imited tactical range in relation to the dimensions of the oceans. Without ln-fllgfat refueling they can not even reach the northern part ofantic Ocean. However, in order to achieve the success--Ui destruction of carrier large units it would befor them to reach atignificant part of the world's oceans.
It is true thatircraft has great capabilities for long-range operation alone. Tbe presence of such aircraft in tne reconnaissance forces of the navy would make ocean reconnaissance to some extent practicable. However, naval aviat.on coss not have any such aircraft in its composition. Thus, for the time being, there is no possibility of meeting the requirement of naval strike forces for reconnaissance dataar should break out. It can not bC hopedong-range aviation will be assigned to reconnaissar.ee. and that it willuccessfully cope with thentrusted to it. The practical operational training of the fleets has not yet produced any such positive results.
It is only the receipt froa Industry or ther.ed type of aircraft, which also have installedor reconnaissance purposes, sets for guiding the flight of olss-les of the "air-to-ground" class, launched from th-same type of aircraft, which will represent the first step towards the solution of the critical problems ofat 5ea. In other words! one of the problems of reconnaissance of carrier strike large units oar. be resolved Dy administrative action, and is awaiting solution.
Apart from aerial reconnaissance, mobile targets ln tbe ocean, such as are represented by an AUS, can be successfully detected by space reconnaissance fkoinicheskaya razvedka). The present state of devel-psent of missile construction and radio-electronics alreadyeal possibility for reconnaissance of carrier strike large units with artificial satellites. As Is shown by calculations, when photographingatellite at an altitude of JOO km, the image of an aircraft carrierhotograph will bem in lengthameraocal length of one meter). The necessary information on an AUS can be obtained, after Interpretation and enlargement of these photographs. ystem of such artificial satellites will allow carrier strike large units to be detected nt any point of the world's oceans and will provide the necessary time for an aircraft sortie and for the possible redeployment of submarines for the delivery of strikes against tho enemy.
The preparation of an operation for the destruction of enemy carrier strike large units, performing all the operational and tactical measures which arise from the decision of the fleet ccccander on the conduct of the initial operation, must be carried out in advance. Practically, this should find expression in the fact that it is necessary even in peacetime, to have ready strike groupings of our forces consisting of submarines and naval missile aircraft and Including Specified large unita of long-range aviation, and to work out jointly the tasks of the combat training of these heterogeneous forces in the areas of their probable future combat As has been shown in practice by operational training ir. the fleets, the very rare use of long-range aviation in training exercisesegative erfect on its readiness Tor the conductombat operation at sea. In addition^submarines need to-deploy oceanwards from their bases initially even before the beginning of an operation. Disposition of our fleets near the borders makes it possible to accomplish this. However, it must be taken into account that lines of ariti-subaarlycof which enough has been said already, will
a^onside-*ble obstacle to the submarines of the northern Fleet.
One of the tasks conducted by ourpeacetime- must be to ascertain the dimensions defense lines and the nature ofhS overco,Dln6 of these lines willfir3tly byonsiderable
forloywnt of sub-
marines, which, even without this, win he lengthy.
to havetheir control ahead
o. time, togetherystem for the mobile andasing of the navy. This should ensure the e. loymen. of all strike forces within the shortest possible time from the moment of recelot cf thefor the repulseurprise attack and for the delivery of powerful strikes against the enemy's in-vasior. forces.
military leadership has alreadyumber of advanced base areas for the raold
Irln the
Firtr. of Clyde in the British Isles.
er^iniy difficult to imagine that our
ast Ike against the enemy's strike groupings,ll at their bases. It
" lC%iV.CrSd "fcilethe carrier air-
areas. Such strikes
" ^ployed in advance near
of theeneaythe
-Sconsideration the abilityarrier large unit toura, it becomes quite obvious that tKe task of
destroying these large units in the first operationperformed mainly by an aviation grouping. Theof repeated strikes against so highly mobilevill entail serious difficulties and can beonly if he moves repeatedly up tc theline of his aircraft. As for submarines, theytype of force which provides for theof strike's against the enemyengthy
In speaking of submarines, uc are thinking of those with atomic propulsion; torpedo-carrying dlesel-generator driven submarines are of little effectivenessorce for combat with carrier strike large units. In our view, these submarines can count onlyinimum of success, andiyarrier large unit, for some unknown reason,fails to detect them and passes through their position. Ln the event of an unsuccessful attack, these submarines, because of their slow speed, will have no chance to re-deploy for repeated attacks. Zt is true that diesel-ger.erator submarines can nevertheless count on successinal strikearrier large unit ufcich has already been routed, but onlyime when the surviving carriers are taking on fuel, when the mobility and maneuverability of the remaining part of the unit has been reducedInlsum.
The assertion that the shortcomingssel-generator criven submarines, which, result froc their extremely limited capabilities for operations against AUS, can be made up by the deploymentarge number of them, or to put it more precisely,largeolshayaf such submarines*ost dubious one. It is difficult to Imagine the number of submarines which would have to be deployed in en ocean, and ho- it would be possible to cover all the routes for crossings by carrier large units with theo, so as to ensure the emergence of the maximum number of submarines against an AUS and the executiontrike.
eference hersote at the bottom of the page, which is misslng^J
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The use of carrier strike larffr'units, divided into separate strike groups,vill create considerablefor those of our forces engaged in combat vita these groupings. For successful performance of the task of breaking up an enecy nuclear attack froa the sea,it will be necessary to deliver strikes simultaneously against all carrier strike groups, which will lead to dispersal of effortsarge number of objectives. At the same time, the reconnaissance of strike groups and the control of forces delivering strikes against the enemy will grow core complicated. This new aspect of the use of carrier large units creates serious difficulties in the organization of coabat with them, and has the single aim of increasing the operational stability of thefleet. There are, however, other circumstances which should also be considered here. The "divided" use of carrier strike large units will naturally lead to the weakening of the antiair and anti-submarine defenseby Individual strike groups. ingle hunter-killer (polskovo-udarnayo)efense group which is basedingle anti-submarine defensecarrier will not be able to offer seriousto all the submarines capable of launching an attack simultaneously against several carrier strike groupsvianosnaya udarnaya gruppa). Her will the United number of small ships in each AUG provide an adequate degree of stability for these types ofact which will facilitate the delivery of strikes against the enemy by submarines ar.d-
It seems that the main difficulty in the organization of combat with carrier strike large groups will lieea and in guiding the strike groupings of our forces towards thca. The Srst operation against carrier large units will probably be characterized by the limited amount of time available for its fulfillment, because of the short time for which the carrier strike large units will remain within range of the basicof our forces. Under these conditions'St is very Important to act quickly and in a'well-coordinated
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manner, in accordance with that variation for conduct of the operation which suits the actual situation best, selected from those which have been previously "developed ln The combat operations themselves may begin with the decisive rout or the enemy's carrier large units as the result of the delivery of simultaneous and consecutive strikes by the entire deployed naval force and by long-range aviation if, by the decision of the Supreme High Command, the Utter take part in the Tirst sea operation.
The most effective type of operation, from the paint of viev of achieving the goals of the operationimited period of time, will clearly be cce which permits the deliveryingle powerful strike by the maximum number of aircraft end submarines, using almost all the nuclear warheads, allocated for the destruction of the particular AUS, especially those of the aircraft.
tatement of the question may seem unusual. Hitherto, there has been no challenge to the opinion that the most effective method for operationsarrier strike large unit is toeries of strikes against it, and that the initial strike must be the most powerful of these, in order to deprive the enemy or the capability of making massed use of his aircraft and ln order to reduce his mobilityonsiderableubsequent gradual increase of the efforts against carrier larg- units will be carried out by the deployment, from the beginningar, of the first operational echelon ofrimarily of submarines with nuclearby asina that partal aviation which did net take port in the delivery or the first strikes. Ir. our opinion, it is impossible to perform the task of breaking up ar. enemy nuclear attack from the sea byoperations in this manner.
The most important condition for successuclear/missile war will be the immediate seizure of the initiative and its subsequent retention. forces must be used at once in their main- mass, for decisive purposes, so that the enemy is given no
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chance to destroy them at their bases or airfields. The principlereliminaryf the enemy, or operations aimed at reducing the mobility of the enemy can not now be regarded as they were in the past. Submarines and naval aviation are capable of destroying an AUS with one strike regardless of whether it is movingingle, formation or in separate carrier groups. Of course, in the latter case,units of the naval forces will not be committed to battle at once but in accordance with the approach of each group to the take-off line of its carrier aviation. However, the destruction must be accomplished as the resultingle strike rather than of many.
Here there is no need for an examination of the question of which type of forces should perform the
main tesk. It must bc performed both by submarines
those equipped with atomicby missile-carrying aircraft, it should be noted at this point that in case the problem of destroying an AUS arises suddenly, naval end long-range" aviation nay prove to be the only forces to fulfill the task consistently and at high speed. All measures are therefore being taken, even in peacetime, to maintain these types of aviationtate of high combat readiness. This fact must be taken Into account in working out possible variants for the development ofthrfirst operation. However, other factors should also be kept in mind: in difficult weather conditions, the capabilities of submarines for combat with carrier large units may at present prove to be considerably greater than those of existing piloted aircraft, and in such cases the task of destroying carrier strike arge units must be performed mainly by submarine forces.
The deliveryombined strikearrier strike large unit or one of its groups will be more effective than could have been expected whenhad no long-range missiles, and when existing missiles could be guided only when launched separatelyingle direction, flow submarines, tco, have no need to approach the target being attacked closely. They (missile-carrying submarines, for examalej can
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use their weapons even without entering the zone of tba strongest anti-submarine defense of the enemy. Thus, cissiles with nuclear warheads, which are carried by both submarines and aircraft, are altering our previous ideas on operations by these forcesoint strike. The difficulties which used to arise in the course of operational training because of the need to create favorable conditions for the employment of weapons by slow-coving submarines, and to coordinate the timing of their strike with the -arrival, at the target area of aircraft whose presencearget was Halted to minutes, while the time needed by submarines for their approach to the target was measured indifficulties arehing of the past.
Conditions for operations have now been created ir. accordance with the principle "no one waits forut eventrike by heterogeneous forces should not be looked upon as an arbitrary operation by thea. It is especially difficult to regulate the timing ofby aircraft and submarines against different targets. To help the submarines, aircraft must first cf all destroy the hunter-killer anti-submarine group and the ships providing anti-submarine defense for the strike carriers. For their part, submarines, ln order to ensure freedom of action for the aircraft and as part Of the coordinated action, must destroy the antiair defense ships and the radar patrol ships. All these tasks can be performed ihtse first operation only If thereimultaneous strike by alL the forces Aviation destroys the carrier and thedefense ships with its individual units, while its main force strikes against the carriers. trike against the main units (ships) of the AUS, missile-carrying submarines may disorganize its antiair defense and help the aircraft toward success. Torpedo-carrying submarines, using their advantage of detecting enemy surface ships at long range, may make their way toward the strike carriers through gaps in the enemy'sdefense which have been made by aircraft, destroying antiair defense ships within their attack sector.
The organisation of operational and tactical co-rdination callsimilar synchronization of simultaneous operation of forces, since in the process of performing the task of destroying an AUS, one form may give way to another. Greater results .can be expected when the tactical coordination of forces prevails. Almost simultaneous action by ail forces, using various types of weapons, creates'conditions for the enemy which ere too complex for . counteraction by him at one and the same time.against both submarines and.
The final rout arrier large unit can be accomplished during its retirement from the take-off line of its aircraft or in the areas in which It is refueled by mobile supply detachments. Since carrier strike large units, which at present still consist of ships with conventional propulsion, must be refueled approximately once every four days, it is necessary, when planning an operation, to establish with sufficientthe probable refueling areas for these large units,iew to the possible delivery of subsequent strikes against surviving carriers in these areas.
The existence in the strike composition of the American Navy of the atomic aircraft carrierwhich Is capable of operationonger period of time away from bases or supply ships, still does not essentially change the situation. Thiscarrier can take on board more aviation fuel, which, as the foreign press reports, provides for the use of its deck aviation, for eight full days. Thus, the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" possesses twice the degree of self-sufficiency possessed by the "Forrestal" and the "Midway? which must refuel once every four days. However, since the "Enterprise'" needs the support provided by other ships performing various defensive functions, itsll be limited by that of these ships, which require more frequent refueling and the replenishment of other material-technical means. Thus, the existence of one atomic ship in the compositionavy does not
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increase the self-sufficiency of an XUS. It wouldifferent matte-arrier strike large unit or group were entirely made up of atomlcally propelled ships. At the present time, however, thi3 is not the case.
Submarines will remain the principal force for completing the routetreating carrier strike large unit. It is unlikely that their repeated attacks will meet serious oppositionomparatively large number of submarines are taking part ln the pursuit of the AUS. Me do not share tbe opinion that individual submarines will be able,ule, to decide the fate of an AUS; we oust not he guided by possible exceptions. Therefore, even while planning'the first operation, It is necessary to start with the idea that the main body of submarines which took part ln the first strike must pursue the surviving ships of the large unit and inflict total defeat upon them, -or this, submarines can even use torpedos with conventional warheads, saving their unexpended nuclear weapons for subsequent operations.
With the errival of surviving ships in aarea, favorable conditions are createdtrike against them by our strategic missile troops. During refueling, ever, carriers are transformed Into slow-moving targets onsiderable time, and initial data for the launch of missiles for theof covering the area where the warships and the vessels.of the supply detachment are located can be obtained by reconnaissance conducted In good time.
In the course cf the first operation, ar. important part will be played by well-organized radio counter-measures covering all axes and wave bands, disrupting the stability of the enemy's control of his forces and his use of guided missile weapon*. In'the area of an operation it is necessary toind oftn the ether" which, nowadays. In the age of missile weapons, is as important as the achievement of supremacy lh the air was important and decisive ir. the last war.
The great complexity of conducting an operation for the destruction of carrier large units calls for the careful organization of coordination between the forces participating in the operation, and of their control taking into account that these forces must operate in remote areas of the world's oceans. It seems to us that the most suitable type of control of forces deployed at sea is one of centralized control from the shore, at the same time permitting commanders atidehus, for example, the control of ftf submarines can be carried outhore command post uitb duplication of theof the latter through control submarines in the area of the operation; In the caseisruption of snip-to-shore coaaunications, control is assumed by the commander of the submarine large unit (brigade or division)
It is necessary to remember, however,ontrol submarine duplicating transmissions from the shore is subjected to great danger of destruction by the enemy's anti-submarine defense forces. Intensive activity by
locate it and to take measures to destroy It or to force itreat depth, from which it can not continue to
pite of this danger,ethod of control should not be rejected.
The complexity and speed of an operation for the obstruction of enemy carrier large units make the intro-ducvion of ccoprehensive automation into the systea
"aVy and tbcof thecalculation processes'urgently necessary.
o-iMcted control links in the Navy shouiG be automated. Automated systems for
hT^^fii0; computers, erines. In 'surface shipscombat operations, in aircraft, in theof naval and aviation large units, in fleetand ir. the Main Staff of the
IRONBARK
Aa automated control syitem ona submarine ihould, it leeeu to ua, provide,cpie, for th* collec-icr and processing of information on thtor. the navigation of the ehip, on combatand on missile control and the firing of torpedoes. This system will Sake It possible to replace numerous Instrumentsingle electronic computer and tolnrle control board for tbe submarine. The automation of the control of aircraft should ensure the reliability of lengthy flights over the aea underveath*ir conditions.
Automation cf the control system of large units of aircraft or chips will greatly facilitate the workommander am) of his staff if It provides for theand processing of Information on th? situation, for the production of tactical calculations, and of calculations on maneuvering, nr. target allocation and on the preparation of target designations in the employment of weapons, and for the transmission of commands, of target, designations, and of information on tbe use of weapons. ht coding and decoding of material should be provided for, together with the optimum choiceine of communications. imilar system for the control of forces In an operation, If installed in the headquartersleet and In the Main Staff of the flavy, win provide for the collection and processing of Information on the situation, for theof calculations on the use of forces and means and for control of the large unitsleet.
Automation of the control of the forcesleet should be augmentedystem of comprehensiveof materiel-technical supply, capable of keeping an account of provisions and of determining the needs of the fleet, anc of large units, ships, and units withto material-technical means, and able to plan the delivery, and control of transportation of materiel-technical means, and to plan medical support. t
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In order to introduce comprehensive automationroad scale, we must do away with technical conservatism
JRONBARK
uidesigned attitude toward, old act hods, and"-oust overcome the difficulties connected with theof the new technique,undamental approach to tbe problems of technics! improvement. It would be unnecessary, for example, to introduce(which is so expensive) to compute 'the number of aircraft searching for the enemy ln the ocean, using the "combing" method. This is "grandfathers' method, used ins and It can not be takenuide; such calculations can be done with adequate speed and accuracy with paper and pencil. For reconnaissance, far example, automation of tbe calculations of the line or. which enemy carrier strike large units will appear is necessary ln orderimely strike say beagainst thee.
It would also be advisable to automate computation of the timing of deployment of forces and of the quantity of these necessary for successful combat with carrier large ur.lts, as well as the beat ways of usingand aircraft ln the organization cf strikes against an AUS. The automation of control procedures will speed'up the process of reaching decisions inwhich are frequently changing and which are sometimes unclear, and it will increase the effectlvenesa of tbe use of forces in the first operation for theof the carrier strike large units of the enemy.
The new featuros of combat with carrier strike large units which have been examined are the result of the adoption into the armament of the navyew weapon and of Itsand aircraft. Of course, by no means all the natural consequences of this have yet been brought to light. However, the tlse has coc-ritical appraisal of everything which has been worked out In the past on the questions of combat with carrier large units. An attempt at this has been made Ln this article.
Original document.
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